

Automatic Security Evaluation and (Related-key) Differential Characteristic Search: Application to SIMON, PRESENT, LBlock, DES(L) and Other Bit-oriented Block Ciphers

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Outline

- 1. Motivation**
- 2. Existing methods for differential characteristic search**
- 3. Our method**
- 4. Applications and results**

Motivation

- Differential cryptanalysis [Biham, Shamir, 1991] is one of the most powerful attacks on block ciphers
- Finding a good differential characteristic with high probability is the first step in the (related-key) differential attack

Existing methods (I)

□ Matsui's Algorithm

- ✓ Mitsuru Matsui, *On correlation between the order of S-boxes and the strength of DES*, Eurocrypt 1994.
- ✓ Branch and Bound approach
- ✓ Original method only applicable in the single-key setting

□ Variants of Matsui's Algorithm

- ✓ Alex Biryukov, Ivica Nikolic.: Search for related-key differential characteristics in DES-like ciphers. FSE 2011
- ✓ Branch and Bound approach
- ✓ Applicable in the related-key setting, but only for linear key schedule algorithm

□ Integer programming based method

Existing methods (II)

□ Integer programming based method

- ✓ applicable both in single-key and related-key settings
- ✓ can be used to obtain security bounds (bounds of the minimum number of active S-boxes) with respect to differential attack
- ✓ can not be used to obtain good characteristic directly
- ✓ not applicable to bit-oriented block ciphers such as PRESENT, SIMON, DES(L), etc.

● Nicky Mouha, Qingju Wang, Dawu Gu, Bart Preneel. *Differential and linear cryptanalysis using mixed-integer linear Programming*. Inscrypt 2011.

● Shengbao Wu, Mingsheng Wang. *Security Evaluation against Differential Cryptanalysis for Block Cipher Structures*, IACR ePrint 2011/551.

Our method: mixed-integer programming based

□ Integer programming based method

- ✓ applicable both in single-key and related-key settings
- ✓ can be used to obtain security bounds (bounds of the minimum number of active S-boxes) with respect to differential attack
- ✓ can be used to obtain good characteristics directly
- ✓ applicable to bit-oriented block ciphers such as PRESENT, SIMON, DES(L), etc.

Mixed-integer programming: An example

- Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), an example
 - ✓ Objective function
 - ✓ Feasible region: all solutions satisfy the constraints


$$\begin{aligned} & \min -x_1 + x_2 - 2x_3 + x_4 - x_5 \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & \quad x_1 + x_2 \leq 1 \\ & \quad x_1 - 5x_2 + x_3 \leq 2 \\ & \quad 2x_3 + 2x_4 - 4x_5 \leq 1 \\ & \quad x_2 - 2x_4 + x_5 \leq 0 \\ & \quad x \in \{0, 1\}^5 \end{aligned}$$

Our method: The main idea

□ The main idea of our method



- ✓ describe the differential behavior of a cipher “at bit-level” by a set of linear inequalities
- ✓ try to find a characteristic with minimum number of active S-boxes


□ Search for high probability characteristic → Extract a good solution from the feasible region of an MILP problem



Our method: Modeling technique

Variables involved in our MILP model

- ✓ for every S-box we introduce a new 0-1 variable (represented by a ) , such that 1 for active and 0 for otherwise
- ✓ for every input and output bit-level difference of every operation we introduce a new 0-1 variable (represented by a )



* This toy cipher is taken from Lars R. Knudsen et al's book: *The block cipher The Block Cipher Companion*.


Our method: Modeling technique

Objective function

- ✓ Minimize the sum of the variables (represented by \odot), that is, minimize the number of active S-boxes.


Constraints

- ✓ Linear inequalities in the variables represented by \bullet .




Our method: Constraints generation

- How to describe the constraints imposed (by different operations) on the variables denoted by ● and ○ with linear inequalities ?



Our method: Constraints generation for XOR

- Constraints imposed on the input and output differences by XOR



$$a = 0, b = 0 \rightarrow c = 0$$

$$a = 0, b = 1 \rightarrow c = 1$$

$$a = 1, b = 0 \rightarrow c = 1$$

$$a = 1, b = 1 \rightarrow c = 0$$

- Constraints (where d is a dummy variable and all variables are 0-1)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a + b + c \geq 2d \\ d \geq a \\ d \geq b \\ d \geq c \\ a + b + c \leq 2 \end{array} \right.$$

eliminate the case of one and only one of a , b , and c is 1

eliminate the case of $a=1, b=1$ and $c=1$

Our method: Constraints generation for S-box

□ Constraints imposed on the input and output differences by an $m \times n$ S-box (not necessarily invertible)

- ✓ Let x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m be the input difference, and y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n be the output difference
- ✓ Let A be the variable indicating the activity of the S-box



$$x_1 + \dots + x_m - A \geq 0$$


At least one of the input difference bit x_i must be 1 if $A = 1$.

$$\begin{cases} A - x_1 \geq 0 \\ \dots \\ A - x_m \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

A must be 1 (active), when anyone of the input difference x_i is 1.


Our method: a more accurate constraints generation

- However, this is too coarse to describe an specific S-box, and result in an feasible region contain many invalid differential patterns



Our method: a more accurate constraints generation

- Hence, we need the so called valid cutting-off inequalities to remove some impossible differential patterns of an specific S-box.



Our method for constraints generation

- Two methods for generating valid cutting-off inequalities for an specific S-box
 1. Logical condition modeling
 2. Convex hull computation

Method I

□ Logical condition modeling

- ✓ Assume x, y are 0-1 variables, how to describe the logical condition “ x must be 1 when $y = 1$ ” ?

$$x - y \geq 0$$

- ✓ The differentials of some S-boxes has similar properties. For example, the PRESENT S-box.

Fact 1. *The S-box of PRESENT-80 has the following properties:*

(i) $1001 \rightarrow ***0$: *If the input difference of the S-box is $0x9 = 1001$, then the least significant bit of the output difference must be 0;*

(ii) $0001 \rightarrow ***1$ and $1000 \rightarrow ***1$: *If the input difference of the S-box is $0x1 = 0001$ or $0x8 = 1000$, then the least significant bit of the output difference must be 1;*

(iii) $***1 \rightarrow 0001$ and $***1 \rightarrow 0100$: *If the output difference of the S-box is $0x1 = 0001$ or $0x4 = 0100$, then the least significant bit of the input difference must be 1; and*

(iv) $***0 \rightarrow 0101$: *If the output difference of the S-box is $0x5 = 0101$, then the least significant bit of the input difference must be 0.*

Method I

□ Logical condition modeling


- ✓ This conditional differential properties can be described by

$$-x_0 + x_1 + x_2 - x_3 - y_3 + 2 \geq 0$$

$$\begin{cases} x_0 + x_1 + x_2 - x_3 + y_3 \geq 0 \\ -x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + y_3 \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_2 - y_3 \geq 0 \\ x_3 + y_0 - y_1 + y_2 + y_3 \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$-x_3 + y_0 - y_1 + y_2 - y_3 + 2 \geq 0$$





Remove all differential patterns which do not satisfy the differential pattern: $1000 \rightarrow ***0$, $0001 \rightarrow ***1$, $***1 \rightarrow 0001$, $***0 \rightarrow 0101$

Method II

□ Convex hull computation

- ✓ Convex hull of a set of points in \mathbb{R}^n : the smallest convex set that contains these points.



Method II

□ Convex hull computation

✓ A convex hull can be represented by a set of linear inequalities

□ Treat the set of all possible differential patterns of an S-box as a set of points in \mathbb{R}^n . For example, the PRESENT S-box:

{(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1),
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1),
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1), ... }




Corresponds to the differential: 0010 \rightarrow 1101

□ Then we can compute the linear inequalities representation of the set of differential patterns

Method II

□ Convex hull computation

✓ Can we use less inequalities ? Yes!



Method II

□ Convex hull computation

✓ Can we use less inequalities ? Yes!

Algorithm 1: Selecting n inequalities from the convex hull \mathcal{H} of an S-box

Input:

\mathcal{H} : the set of all inequalities in the H-representation of the convex hull of an S-box;

\mathcal{X} : the set of all possible differential patterns of an S-box;

n : a positive integer.

Output: \mathcal{O} : a set of n inequalities selected from \mathcal{H}

```
1  $l^* := \text{None}$ ;  
2  $\mathcal{X}^* := \mathcal{X}$ ;  
3  $\mathcal{H}^* := \mathcal{H}$ ;  
4  $\mathcal{O} := \emptyset$ ;  
5 for  $i \in \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$  do  
6    $l^* :=$  The inequality in  $\mathcal{H}^*$  which maximizes the number of removed  
   impossible differential patterns from  $\mathcal{X}^*$  ;  
7    $\mathcal{X}^* := \mathcal{X}^* - \{\text{removed impossible differential patterns by } l^*\}$ ;  
8    $\mathcal{H}^* := \mathcal{H}^* - \{l^*\}$ ;  
9    $\mathcal{O} := \mathcal{O} \cup \{l^*\}$ ;  
10 end  
11 return  $\mathcal{O}$ 
```

Applications

- Automatic security evaluation with respect to single-key and related-key differential attacks.
 - ✓ obtain the lower bound of the number of active S-boxes of all characteristics
 - ✓ useful in the design of block ciphers

- Automatic search for single-key and related-key differential characteristics
 - ✓ obtain characteristics with high probability
 - ✓ useful in (related-key) differential attack, (related-key) boomerang attack, biclique attack ...

Application I : Security evaluation

- obtain the lower bound of the number of active S-boxes of all characteristics.
 1. Set the objective function to be the sum of all variables indicating the activities of the S-boxes;
 2. Include the constraints imposed by the operations involved in the cipher;
 3. Require that all variables are 0-1;
 4. Solve the MILP model using the Gurobi optimizer , and the objective value of the optimized solution is a lower bound of the number of active S-boxes.



<http://www.gurobi.com>

Application I : Security evaluation

- lower bounds of the number of active S-boxes of the related-key characteristics of PRESENT-80

Rounds	With CDP Constraints		Without CDP Constraints	
	# Active S-boxes	# Time(in seconds)	# Active S-boxes	# Time(in seconds)
1	0	1	0	1
2	0	1	0	1
3	1	1	1	1
4	2	1	2	1
5	3	5	3	3
6	5	16	4	10
7	7	107	6	26
8	9	254	8	111
9	10	522	9	171
10	13	4158	12	1540
11	15	18124	13	8136
12	16	50017	15	18102
13	18	137160*	17	49537*
14	20	1316808*	18	685372*
15	–	> 20days	–	> 20days

There is no related-key characteristic for 12+12=24-round PRESENT-80 with probability higher than $(2^{-2})^{16} \times (2^{-2})^{16} = 2^{-64}$

Warning !

- Such bounds are only valid for *characteristics*, not for *differentials*

Application II : Characteristic search

- obtain characteristics with high probability
 1. Set the objective function to be the sum of all variables indicating the activities of the S-boxes;
 2. Include the constraints imposed by the operations involved in the cipher;
 3. Require that all variables are 0-1;
 4. Solve the MILP model using the Gurobi optimizer, extract a feasible solution when the objective value is small enough;
 5. Check whether the solution is a valid characteristic. If it is invalid, add some valid cutting-off inequalities and go to step 4. If it is valid, we now have a characteristic.

Application II : Characteristic search

- Improved 15-round single-key differential characteristic and differential for SIMON48, a lightweight block cipher designed by NSA.

SIMON48		
Rounds	Left	Right
0	000000001000000000000000	000000100010001000000000
1	000000000010001000000000	000000001000000000000000
2	000000000000010000000000	000000000010001000000000
3	000000000000000100000000	000000000000100000000000
4	000000000000000000000000	000000000000001000000000
5	00000000000000000100000000	000000000000000000000000
6	000000100000100000000000	00000000000000001000000000
7	00000000000100010000000010	000000100000100000000000
8	001000001000001000001000	000000000010001000000010
9	00000000000100010000000010	001000001000001000001000
10	000000100000100000000000	000000000010001000000010
11	00000000000000000100000000	000000100000100000000000
12	000000000000000000000000	000000000000001000000000
13	00000000000000000100000000	000000000000000000000000
14	000000000000010000000000	000000000000001000000000
15	000000000010001000000000	000000000000100000000000

The probability of the above characteristic is 2^{-46} ; by considering the differential effect, the probability is $2^{-41.96}$, which is the best result published so far for SIMON48.



Thanks!

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